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CONSTITUTIONAL PROMISES OF INDIGENOUS RECOGNITION: 
CANADA, VANUATU AND THE CHALLENGES OF PLURALISM  
 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Multiculturalism and ‘de-colonialism’ have brought an ever-stronger 
awareness of the pluralism underlying modern legal realities. Most acutely, 
Indigenous peoples’ demands for recognition of culture and prior connection often 
come with a reassertion of customary laws1 and customary entitlements.2 Yet 
meaningful accommodation of these, within a dominant western legal system, is 
an enormous challenge. Often the difficulties seem to have been underestimated; 
across the years even countries and institutions well-disposed to customary laws 
have periodically fallen into the trap of treating them as akin to state laws (or foreign 
laws with local equivalents)3 and expecting them to behave in the same way.4 
When they did not, or as oral traditions did not lend themselves to western proof,5 
it was tempting to fall back on a denial of their character (as law) or their capacity 
to create tangible rights. 6  Accordingly, recognition of customary laws often 
remained aspirational, and past advocacy often lingered on questions about 
character, compatibility, veracity and certainty.7 Today, it is more widely accepted 
that customary laws are law8 and cognisable as such9 (albeit with deeper roots 
and different means of transmission and manifestation), and that the perceived 
disadvantage of ‘uncertainty’ is an invention of western perspective.10 Accordingly, 
discussions have diversified and deepened.   
 
There has been broad discussion in various jurisdictions on the importance 
of promoting the revitalisation of customary laws, on the need to move recognition 
                                            
1 Used broadly here to mean Indigenous laws, traditions and custom (or ‘kastom’ as it is 
increasingly referred to in Vanuatu).  
2 On the difficulties of definition see, eg, Australian Law Reform Commission, The Recognition of 
Aboriginal Customary Laws (Report No 31, 1986) 98-101; New Zealand Law Commission, 
Converging Currents – Custom and Human Rights in the Pacific (Study Paper 17, 2006) paras 
4.23-4.30; see also John Borrows, Canada’s Indigenous Constitution (University of Toronto Press 
Incorporated 2010) 51-55. 
3 [reference deleted for author anonymity] 
4 See further [reference deleted for author anonymity]. 
5 On the complexities of proving customary law see, eg, [reference deleted for author anonymity]. 
6 See, eg, [reference deleted for author anonymity]. 
7 See generally John Borrows, ‘Indigenous Legal Traditions in Canada’ (2006) Report for the Law 
Commission of Canada, v; John Borrows, Canada’s Indigenous Constitution (n 2) 12, 56; New 
Zealand Law Commission, Converging Currents – Custom and Human Rights in the Pacific (n 2) 
para 4.6.  
8 See, eg, Brian Z Tamahana, Caroline Sage and Michael Woolcock (eds), Legal Pluralism and 
Development: Scholars and Practitioners in Dialogue (Cambridge University Press 2012); John 
Borrows, ‘Indigenous Legal Traditions in Canada’ (n 7). 
9 See John Borrows, ‘With or Without You: First Nations Law (in Canada)’ (1996) 41 McG LJ 629. 
10 See further, eg, [reference deleted for author anonymity]. 
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beyond mere aspiration, and on the problems of framing the exercise within 
western law perspectives.11 This article touches on these issues, but focusses on 
the practical mechanics of recognition. Our specific interest is the implementation 
of constitutional recognition – a setting which brings a socio-political depth to the 
challenges and a measure of indelibility to the outcomes.   
 
Two conspicuous attempts at contemporary constitutional recognition are 
found in Canada and Vanuatu. Section 35(1) of the Canadian Constitution Act 
1982 recognises and affirms the ‘existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the 
aboriginal peoples of Canada’.12 In Vanuatu, the Constitution commences with a 
commitment to ‘cherishing …. ethnic, linguistic and cultural diversity’13 and the 
enacting provisions expressly state that customary laws ‘shall continue to have 
effect as part of the law of the Republic’.14 This article examines the histories of 
these initiatives and traces each country’s struggle to translate bold constitutional 
promises to legal reality.   
 
In Canada, the colonial history and modern context has produced 
contemporary constitutional recognition of ‘aboriginal rights’. In Vanuatu, with 
its different complex story, it is customary laws themselves that are recognised. 
‘Customary law’ significantly overlaps with the emanations of customary law 
affirmed as ‘rights’ in Canada, and similar challenges underlie both sets of broadly 
drawn provisions. Yet, with some methodological risk, we are certainly comparing 
different stories – as the differing constitutional provisions might suggest. Vanuatu 
(formerly the New Hebrides) is a small island country,15 where the Indigenous 
peoples (known collectively as Ni-Vanuatu) form the majority of the population.16 
Canada, on the other hand, is one of the largest countries by land mass,17 but the 
Indigenous population constitutes a small minority (in part because of past colonial 
                                            
11 In the Canadian context, see Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, ‘Honouring the 
Truth, Reconciling for the Future: Summary of the Final Report of the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission of Canada’ (2015); John Borrows, Freedom & Indigenous Constitutionalism 
(University of Toronto Press 2016); Robert Y Clifford, ‘WSÁNEĆ Legal Theory and the Fuel Spill 
at Selektel (Goldstream River)’ (2016) 61 McG LJ 755; Aaron Mills, ‘The Lifeworlds of Law: On 
Revitalizing Indigenous Legal Orders Today’ (2016) 61 McG LJ 847; Hadley Friedland, ‘Waniskā: 
Reimagining the Future with Indigenous Legal Traditions’ (2016) 33 Windsor YB Access Just 85. 
12 Emphasis added. 
13 Constitution of Vanuatu 1980, Preamble. 
14 ibid art 95(3). 
15 The total land area is approximately 12,200 square kilometres and the territorial waters cover 
450,000 square kilometres: Government of Vanuatu, 
<http://www.governmentofvanuatu.gov.vu/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=52&It
emid=62>. The population is 272,459: Vanuatu National Statistics Office, ‘2016 Mini Census 
Report, Vol 1’ (2016) 1 
<https://vnso.gov.vu/index.php/component/advlisting/?view=download&fileId=4542>. 
16 About 99% of the population are Ni-Vanuatu: Vanuatu National Statistics Office, ‘2016 Mini 
Census Report, Vol 1’ (2016) 57 
<https://vnso.gov.vu/index.php/component/advlisting/?view=download&fileId=4542>. 
17 Canada is almost 10 million square kilometres in size: ‘Canada Facts’ 
<https://www.canadafacts.org/>. 
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policies).18 The countries’ relevant legal histories also differ somewhat – notably in 
the respective roles of conflict and agreement.19 In Canada, the contemporary 
legal focus is ongoing exploration of land-use and self-government rights around 
and beyond historic regional treaties. In Vanuatu, national sovereignty belongs to 
the people of Vanuatu20 and all land in the Republic ‘belongs to the indigenous 
custom owners and their descendants.’21 Whilst there has been the occasional 
power struggle between the State and traditional leaders,22 the contemporary legal 
focus is translating the recognition of customary laws23 (a somewhat inevitable 
product of demographics and Independence). It is also noteworthy that Canada 
has built a significantly larger body of relevant case law and commentary.    
 
Importantly, it is hoped that the differences in the journeys of Canada and 
Vanuatu will contribute breadth and originality to our study, and ultimately provide 
a more complete picture of the cumulative and successive challenges at play. 
Moreover, there are some enticing correlations in these journeys. The most 
obvious and most critical is the centrality of the constitutional provisions – in each 
case broadly worded and bold in their aspirations. More specifically, both countries 
have French and English legal heritage, and retain the two official languages24 and 
a western legal framework combining laws from both sources. Traditional 
communities are strong and somewhat diverse, and allegiances to local laws and 
community often outweigh any sense of national identity. Tension between state 
and customary laws is frequent in both countries. It is also notable that these 
countries have cross-referred to each other in the course of contemporary legal 
reform. The human rights chapter of Vanuatu’s Constitution is modelled on the 
Canadian Constitution. 25 And the possibility of using recognition models from 
Pacific Island States, including Vanuatu, was raised by the Law Reform 
Commission of Canada in a discussion paper on Indigenous legal traditions.26 
 
The key challenge here, through the lens of either country’s experience, is 
not a new one. As alluded to above, the task of reconciling different legal systems 
                                            
18 The 2016 census identified 4.9% of the national population as Aboriginal peoples (First 
Nations, Métis and Inuit): Statistics Canada, ‘Aboriginal Peoples Highlight Tables, 2016 Census’ 
(20 February 2019) <https://www12.statcan.gc.ca/census-recensement/2016/dp-pd/hlt-fst/abo-
aut/Table.cfm?Lang=Eng&T=101&S=99&O=A>. 
19 There are exceptions to the lack of activism in Vanuatu, particularly in the lead up to 
independence. See further below regarding Nagriamel and, eg, the discussion of Nagriamel in 
Howard Van Trease, The Politics of Land in Vanuatu: From Colony to Independence (Institute of 
Pacific Studies, University of the South Pacific 1987).  
20 Constitution of Vanuatu 1980, art 4(1). 
21 ibid art 73. 
22 See, eg, PP v Leo [2018] VUSC 75, discussed below. 
23 Constitution of Vanuatu 1980, art 95(3). 
24 Vanuatu has a third official language, Bislama, which is a creole language derived mainly from 
English: Constitution of Vanuatu 1980, art 3. 
25 Constitution Act 1982 (Can), enacted as Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), which came 
into force on 17 April 1982. 
26 Law Reform Commission of Canada, Justice Within: Indigenous Legal Traditions (Discussion 
Paper, 2006) 25. 
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has been challenging theorists and practitioners for many years. There are 
fundamental challenges arising simply from diversity: the ‘constituent units of legal 
pluralism are distinct legal regimes, typically with separate rules, logics and 
practices’.27 Yet in the context of Indigenous histories those challenges are often 
magnified by the unilateralism and injustices of the past and the political and 
economic imbalances of the present. Constitutional context can bring further 
challenges – via broad aspirational drafting, more legal ‘layers’, and greater 
political entanglement. 
 
The Canada and Vanuatu examples illustrate well many of the broad and 
specific difficulties presented by pluralism – whether that is manifested (and best 
conceptualised) as a competition of ‘systems’ or of multiple worldviews within a 
‘system’.28 The difficulties are many. What is the precise hierarchy of laws (which 
in a complex politico-legal history might find many sources)? How is recognition 
accurately achieved across different systems (built on very different worldviews)? 
How are local variations (or differences of view) accommodated? Is the western 
system to be rewarded for its past interference with customary practices? Can the 
western system claim some inviolability for its fundamental tenets, or priority for its 
own central purposes? Does the western translation (and/or attending process) 
inevitably carry some filtering, de-contextualisation, ‘freezing’ or disruption of 
customary laws?29 Can the collaboration ever be effective when only one system 
is called upon to explain and justify itself? And ultimately, what is the form and 
purpose of recognition? Is it simply to ascertain and acknowledge the ‘facts’ of 
Indigenous legal traditions, to build evidence of pre-contact existence and 
practices, to identify sources of surviving rights and obligations, and/or to make 
space for dynamic emanations of contemporary self-government?30 
 
As will be seen, in both countries it has largely been left to the courts to 
grapple with these questions and give meaning to the constitutional provisions – 
in a necessarily incremental and ad hoc way. In both countries, this journey is 
difficult and ongoing. 
 
 
 
II. CANADIAN HISTORY AND CONTEXT 
                                            
27 Sally Engle Merry, ‘Legal Pluralism and Legal Culture: Mapping the Terrain’ in Brian Z 
Tamanaha, Caroline Sage and Michael Woolcock (eds), Legal Pluralism and Development: 
Scholars and Practitioners in Dialogue (Cambridge University Press 2012) 70. 
28 We acknowledge that Canada’s pluralism arising from the marriage of common law and civil 
law is legally well-established — we refer here to what has been described in Canada as the 
further step (in relation to customary laws) from ‘bi-juridicalism to multi-juridicalism’: see John 
Borrows, ‘Indigenous Legal Traditions in Canada’ (n 7) iv.  
29 See eg Val Napoleon, ‘Tsilhqot’in Law of Consent: International Indigenous Trickster Court’ 
(2015) 48 UBC L Rev 873; Alan Hanna, ‘Making the Round: Aboriginal Title in the Common Law 
from a Tsilhqot’in Legal Perspective’ (2013) 45 Ottawa L Rev 365, 369. 
30 See eg Kirsten Anker, ‘Reconciliation in Translation: Indigenous Legal Traditions and Canada’s 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission’ (2016) 33 Windsor YB Access Just 15, 17. 
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A. Constitutional foundations and the place of First Nations 
 
The cornerstones of Canada’s constitutional history include an early recognition of 
the existence and rights of Aboriginal peoples and attempts to centralise colonial 
authority to infringe on those rights. The Royal Proclamation of 1763 (which 
followed the Treaty of Paris31 and declared the Crown’s policy on British North 
America)32 referred to the reservation of Indian Hunting Grounds in areas not 
‘ceded to or purchased by’ the Crown, and prohibited acquisition of such land 
except through Crown processes. 33  Subsequently the Constitution Act 1867 
(UK),34 in distributing power between the newly-defined Canadian federal and 
provincial governments,35 directed legislative authority over ‘Indians and lands 
reserved for the Indians’ to the new federal Parliament.36 Reflected in and framed 
by these constitutional terms, there was a long history of treaty-making and 
reservation of Aboriginal lands across significant parts of Canada — driven by the 
colonial objectives of alliance and orderly settlement. 37  Yet First Nation 
governments long remained somewhat invisible in the constitutional structure (as 
interpreted and applied).38 Even the precise status of underlying Aboriginal rights 
to land remained uncertain for many years.39 The Supreme Court only clearly 
confirmed the existence of ‘Indian title’ and its common law source in the Calder 
decision of 1973.40    
 
Discussion of constitutional reform began soon after confederation, but 
focussed for many years on Britain’s control over amendment processes. Yet by 
the late 1960s discussion had turned to a more significant patriation of the 
                                            
31 Signed by France, England and Spain following the Seven Years War, and the acknowledged 
source of colonial British sovereignty over much of Canada: St Catherine’s Milling and Lumber Co 
v The Queen (1887) 13 SCR 577 (SCC), 624 and St Catherine’s Milling and Lumber Co v The 
Queen (1887) 14 App Cas 46, 53 (PC).  
32 Note the long controversy over the extent of its application in Canada: Calder v British 
Colombia (Attorney-General) (1973) 34 DLR (3d) 145, 153-156 and 203-208; R v Marshall; R v 
Bernard [2005] 2 SCR 220.  
33 RSC 1985, App II, No 1. 
34 Originally enacted as the British North America Act 1867. 
35 30 & 31 Victoria, c 3, ss 91 and 92, reprinted in section RSC 1985 App II, No 5. 
36 Constitution Act 1867 (UK) s 91(24).  
37 See Douglas N Sprague, ‘Canada’s Treaties with Aboriginal Peoples’ (1996) 23 Manitoba LJ 
341. 
38 See particularly Brian Slattery, ‘Aboriginal Sovereignty and Imperial Claims’ (1991) 29 OHLJ 
681, 682; John Borrows, ‘Sovereignty's Alchemy: An Analysis of Delgamuukw v British Columbia’ 
(1991) 37 OHLJ 537, 538; Kent McNeil, ‘The Decolonization of Canada: Moving Toward 
Recognition of Aboriginal Governments’ (1994) 7 W Legal Hist 113; and James [Sa’Ke’j] 
Youngblood Henderson, ‘Dialogical Governance: A Mechanism for Constitutional Governance’ 
(2009) 72 Sask L Rev 29. 
39 Early recognition was technically uncertain: St Catherines Milling and Lumber Company v R 
(1887) 13 SCR 577; St Catherine’s Milling and Lumber Company v R (1888) 14 App Cas 46.   
40 Calder v Attorney-General of British Columbia (1973) 34 DLR (3d) 145, 152 per Judson J and 
200 per Hall J. See also, Re Paulette and Registrar of Titles (No 2) (1973) 42 DLR (3d) 8, 26-7; 
and see further Guerin v The Queen [1984] 2 SCR 335 as to developing conceptions of the 
nature of the ‘title’ and the obligations of the government.   
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Constitution and entrenchment of a bill of rights. 41  Importantly for present 
purposes, an assimilationist 1969 government ‘White Paper on Indian Policy’,42 
awakened and strengthened a First Nations voice43 in the debates — with calls 
coming (particularly from the west) for greater protection of Aboriginal rights and 
identity by constitutional amendment.44 This momentum was soon bolstered by the 
Calder decision referred to above, which crystallised the potential significance of 
common law Aboriginal title 45 and prompted renewed negotiation of claims. 46 
When protection for Aboriginal rights did not materialise in the constitutional plans, 
a coalition of Aboriginal groups pressured governments with national 
demonstrations. 47  Yet there was also some opposition amongst Aboriginal 
peoples, on the basis that the proposals could result in some erosion of their 
nationhood and distinct legal identity.48   
 
Ultimately, broadly cast protections did emerge: s 35 of the Canadian 
Constitution Act 1982 recognises and affirms the ‘existing aboriginal and treaty 
rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada’. This provision gave these rights 
constitutional status. However, the section was in many respects a ‘shell without a 
filling’, 49  as it does not define these ‘rights’ nor the nature of the protection 
conferred. It also failed to define what was meant by ‘existing’ rights.50 The ensuing 
exploration has focussed primarily on land use rights, but the plain meaning of 
‘rights’ is broader.51 On the other hand, as will be seen this notion of ‘Aboriginal 
rights’ has become something narrower than the full manifestation of all Aboriginal 
traditions or laws (even in the context of land use).   
 
                                            
41 See [reference deleted for author anonymity]. 
42 ‘Statement of the Government of Canada on Indian Policy’ (Department of Indian and Northern 
Affairs (Ottawa) 1969) <http://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/200/301/inac-ainc/indian_policy-
e/cp1969_e.pdf>.  
43 See John Borrows and Leonard Rotman, Aboriginal Legal Issues: Cases, Materials & 
Commentary (4th edn, LexisNexis Canada 2012) 93. See further Kent McNeil, ‘The 
Decolonization of Canada: Moving Toward Recognition of Aboriginal Governments’ (n 38) 118ff. 
44 See particularly Indian Association of Alberta, Citizens Plus (Indian Association of Alberta 
1970); and The Union of BC Indian Chiefs, ‘A Declaration of Indian Rights: The B.C. Indian 
Position Paper’ (17 November 1970). 
45 Particularly for regions with a lesser treaty / agreement history. 
46 See eg Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, ‘In All Fairness: A Native 
Claims Policy’ (1981).  
47 See John Borrows and Leonard Rotman, Aboriginal Legal Issues: Cases, Materials & 
Commentary (n 43) 95. 
48 John Borrows and Leonard Rotman, Aboriginal Legal Issues: Cases, Materials & Commentary 
(n 43) esp 93. See further Peter S Vicaire, ‘Two Roads Diverged: A Comparative Analysis of 
Indigenous Rights in a North American Constitutional Context’ (2013) 58 McG LJ 607, 611. 
49 Ira Barkin ‘Aboriginal Rights: A Shell Without the Filling’ (1990) 15(2) Queens LJ 307. 
50 The ‘cautious’ inclusion of the word ‘existing’ appeared to be a product of provincial concerns 
over the potential scope of the provision: Mary Dawson, ‘From the Backroom to the Front Line: 
Making Constitutional History’ (2012) 57 McG LJ 955, 967-68. 
51 See the implications of cases such as R v Pamajewon [1996] 2 SCR 821. 
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The proponents and drafters of section 35 were aware of its uncertainties.52 
The 1982 document itself, in section 37, provided for a constitutional conference 
to be held soon after to discuss matters including ‘the identification and definition’ 
of ‘rights’. That initial conference produced clarifying amendment on specific 
issues,53 but no substantial progress on the central issues of definition. Instead 
section 37.1 was added, providing for at least two further conferences. Further 
conferences were held between 1984 and 1987, but without significant progress 
on definitional issues or contested questions about self-governance. 54  Later 
negotiations produced a broad package of proposed amendments (the 
‘Charlottetown Accord’) 55  that did address Aboriginal representation and self-
government,56 but in October 1992 Canadians voted by referendum to reject the 
Accord. Importantly, it is understood that concerns over erosion of existing nation-
to-nation relations, inadequate consultation, financing issues and gender equality 
issues led to some significant opposition by treaty-covered First Nations peoples.57         
 
Canada was accordingly left with little guidance on the meaning of section 
35’s recognition and affirmation of ‘Aboriginal rights’. A difficult legal journey was 
inevitable. The task of translation and implementation has fallen to the courts — 
resulting in an ad hoc exploration of the issues, complex problems of reconciliation 
with common law precedent, concerns over the cultural competence of legal 
professionals,58 and debates over conflation of legal, moral and political questions 
in the pursuit of a workable constitutional compromise. This struggle (traced later 
in this article) is an important case study on western law’s practical receptivity to 
customary laws and the challenges of legal pluralism. 
 
B. Pre-existing recognition of customary laws 
 
To complete the background to Canada’s section 35 we should reflect briefly on 
how customary laws have been dealt with more generally. The deeper history of 
Canada, as for many settler-colonial countries, is filled with successive 
                                            
52 See [reference deleted for author anonymity]. 
53 Namely the extension of ‘treaty rights’ to new land claim agreements and a confirmation of 
gender equality in the s 35 guarantee (see s 35 (3) and (4)); and the inclusion of an Aboriginal 
consultation provision (s 35.1). 
54 As to the proposals discussed and what was achieved see Kent McNeil, ‘The Decolonization of 
Canada: Moving Toward Recognition of Aboriginal Governments’ (n 38) 28-29; Paul Chartrand, 
‘Background’, in Paul Chartrand (ed), Who are Canada’s Aboriginal Peoples? (Purich Publishing 
2002) 28-29. 
55 ‘Consensus Report on the Constitution, August 28’ (August 28 1992) Final Text, 
<http://www.solon.org/Constitutions/Canada/English/Proposals/CharlottetownConsensus.html>. 
56 See generally Kent McNeil, ‘The Decolonization of Canada: Moving Toward Recognition of 
Aboriginal Governments’ (n 38) 129ff; [reference deleted for author anonymity]. 
57 See again Kent McNeil, ‘The Decolonization of Canada: Moving Toward Recognition of 
Aboriginal Governments’ (n 38) 132ff. 
58 See Alan Hanna, ‘Spaces for Sharing: Searching for Indigenous Law on the Canadian Legal 
Landscape’ (2018) 51 UBCLR 105, 146ff. 
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assimilationist policies that left little room for engagement with customary laws.59 
In recent times, despite growing understanding, that engagement has remained 
somewhat specific and limited.   
 
In the absence of any general legislative initiative, various statutes have 
referenced specific customary laws for particular purposes 60  — notably (but 
controversially)61 the many iterations of the current Indian Act 1985. More broadly, 
First Nations’ federally-legislated on-reserve ‘jurisdiction’ (relating to matters such 
as membership, public order, land and resource use)62 is a potentially important 
conduit for customary principles. Yet in this context those principles tend to be 
confined and filtered by the imposition of western processes.63   
 
A number of treaties also provide some specific recognition of customary 
laws and rights. ‘Treaty rights’ are now ‘recognized and affirmed’ under section 35 
(along with ‘Aboriginal rights’), underlining their enforceable nature.64 Examples of 
customary law recognition, and indeed authority to practise and develop those 
laws, can be found both in colonial treaties (typically formalising purchase and 
reservation of lands, alliances, and/or peace agreements)65 and modern Land 
Claims Agreements.66 Notably, in addition to the creation of reserves (often in 
traditional territory), many of these early and modern settlements preserve 
subsistence rights over surrendered lands — in terms respecting the traditional 
practices and customs.   
 
The modern agreements are inevitably more specific in their definition of 
rights, and customary law recognition is often now somewhat subsumed by the 
broader attention to ‘self-government’. As discussed further below, broad or 
                                            
59 See generally, eg, Kirsten Manley-Casimir, ‘Toward a Bijural Interpretation of the Principle of 
Respect in Aboriginal law’ (2016) 61 McG LJ 939. 
60 See further Sebastien Grammond, ‘The Reception of Indigenous Legal Systems in Canada’, in 
Albert Breton et al. (eds), Multijuralism: Manifestations, Causes, and Consequences (Ashgate 
Publishing 2009) 51-52; John Borrows, Canada’s Indigenous Constitution (n 2). 
61 See eg Alan Hanna, ‘Spaces for Sharing: Searching for Indigenous Law on the Canadian Legal 
Landscape’ (n 58) 127ff. 
62 See the Indian Act 1985 (eg s 81) and the First Nations Land Management Act 1999 (eg s 20). 
63 See eg Alan Hanna, ‘Spaces for Sharing: Searching for Indigenous Law on the Canadian Legal 
Landscape’ (n 58) 130ff; Aaron Dewitt, ‘Judicial Review as a Limit to Indigenous Self-
Governance’ (2014) 77 Sask L Rev 205, 206.  
64 Canadian treaties have long been attended by debates over their meaning and intent and 
indeed the precise legal principles applicable to them — see eg: Douglas Sanders, ‘Aboriginal 
Peoples and the Constitution’ (1981) 19 Alberta LR 410; Brian Slattery, ‘Making Sense of 
Aboriginal and Treaty Rights’ (2000) 79 Can B Rev 196; and Kate Gunn, ‘Agreeing to Share: 
Treaty 3, History & the Courts’ (2018) 51 UBCLR 75. 
65 See eg the Treaty of 1760; and see Sioui v Quebec (Attorney-General) [1987] 4 CNLR 118 and 
the appeal in [1990] 1 SCR 1025.     
66 See eg James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement 1975; Nunavut Land Claims Agreement 
1993; Nisga’a Final Agreement 1998; Labrador Inuit Land Claims Agreement 2005. For a detailed 
discussion on the status of Indigenous law in modern treaties see Ghislain Otis, ‘La Place des 
Cultures Juridiques et des Langues Authochtones dans les Traites d’Autonomie Gouvernmentale 
au Canada’ (2009) 54 McG LJ 237. 
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specific self-government agreements (another potential conduit for customary 
principles) can be negotiated as part of a comprehensive land claim,67 or as a 
stand-alone agreement (often in the context of a reserve). 68  The nature and 
limitations of these agreements have been incrementally explored in 
commentary. 69  In British Columbia, with its lack of historic treaties, ‘shared 
decision-making’ agreements have also come to prominence as an attempt to build 
frameworks for collaboration on land management (particularly in response to the 
modern ‘consultation’ obligations flowing from the section 35 jurisprudence — 
discussed below). It has been argued, however, that these ‘shared decision-
making’ agreements have generally fallen short of enabling First Nation 
communities to significantly contribute by reference to their own laws and 
customs.70 
  
The courts have found constitutional space for the agreed recognition of 
customary law-making power, 71  and themselves provided further actual 
recognition of customary laws in specific contexts — including marriage, adoption, 
band membership and elections, and sentencing.72 In the latter regard, specific 
initiatives include the ‘First Nations Court’ (within the Provincial Court of British 
Columbia) that works holistically in sentencing, recognising the unique 
circumstances of First Nations defendants and encouraging communities to 
contribute to the process. 73  Also in the court space, the incremental legal 
                                            
67 See, eg, Nisga’a Final Agreement, proclaimed in force 11 May 2000 <http://nisgaalisims.ca/the-
nisgaa-final-agreement>. For relevant unsuccessful challenges see Campbell v British Columbia 
[2000] 4 CNLR 1 (BCSC); and Chief Mountain v Canada 2013 BCCA 49. For broad discussion, 
see Kent McNeil, ‘The Jurisdiction of Inherent Right Aboriginal Governments’ (2007) National 
Centre for First Nations Governance Research Paper; Joshua Nichols, ‘A Reconciliation without 
Recollection? Chief Mountain and the Sources of Sovereignty’ (2015) 48 UBCLR 515. See also 
Douglas C Harris, ‘Property and Sovereignty: An Indian Reserve and a Canadian City’ (2017) 50 
UBCLR 321. 
68 Government of Canada, ‘General Briefing Note on Canada's Self-government and 
Comprehensive Land Claims Policies and the Status of Negotiations’ (2015) <http://www.aadnc-
aandc.gc.ca/eng/1373385502190/1373385561540>. See also ‘Self-government’ (Government of 
Canada, 7 December 2018) <https://www.rcaanc-
cirnac.gc.ca/eng/1100100032275/1529354547314>. 
69 Including in a 2016 special issue of the McGill Law Journal on Indigenous law and legal 
pluralism (vol 61).  
70 See generally, ‘Step by Step: Final Report for the Shared Decision Making in BC Project’ 
(March 2015) Simon Fraser University Centre for Dialogue Research Paper, 46 
<https://www.sfu.ca/content/dam/sfu/centre-for-dialogue/Watch-and-
Discover/SDM/SDM_Final_Report.pdf>; and Alan Hanna, ‘Spaces for Sharing: Searching for 
Indigenous Law on the Canadian Legal Landscape’ (n 58) 134ff. The acknowledged exception is 
the Haida Nation agreement of 2009, seen to ensure customary law influence through the 
agreement terms and community membership of the decision-making council: Alan Hanna (n 58)  
136ff.  
71 Campbell v British Columbia [2000] 4 CNLR 1 – discussed above. 
72 See generally Campbell v British Columbia [2000] 4 CNLR 1; Kirsten Anker (n 30) 26. 
73 See ‘Specialized Courts’ (Provincial Court of British Columbia, 2014) 
<http://www.provincialcourt.bc.ca/about-the-court/specialized-courts#FirstNationsCourt>. See 
generally Alan Hanna, ‘Spaces for Sharing: Searching for Indigenous Law on the Canadian Legal 
Landscape’ (n 58) 149ff. 
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awakening of common law Aboriginal title (prior to section 35) entailed some 
common law appreciation of customary laws — but their precise role in this context 
remained uncertain for many years.74   
 
Inevitably there have been conspicuous assertions of customary law 
authority outside of the avenues discussed above. Notable recent examples 
include the assertion of environmental assessment authority by the Tsleil-Waututh 
Nation in relation to a pipeline expansion in its traditional territory; and the 
introduction (without federal authority) of a Mohawk Court on the Akwesasne 
reserve on the Ontario/Quebec/New York borders.75       
 
A key theme of the very significant 2015 final report of the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission of Canada,76 which emerged from the Commission’s 
six years of hearings involving residential school survivors across Canada, was 
the importance of respecting and revitalising Indigenous legal traditions.77 This 
acknowledgment of importance, and indeed the resurgence in fact of Indigenous 
legal traditions,78 stand in contrast to the quite constrained legal accommodation 
of customary laws revealed by the brief review above. The section 35 framework 
had ushered in a potentially deeper engagement. Through the protection of 
specific ‘Aboriginal rights’ the associated customary laws might find a voice in the 
Constitution.79 And the broader notion of ‘Aboriginal title’ that would re-emerge 
through section 35 might stimulate renewed respect for customary connections 
and land uses, protect a modern ‘title’ that could draw on a range of customary 
laws, and potentially build new recognition of First Nation ‘jurisdiction’. 
Alternatively, section 35 could be read as a lesser engagement with customary 
laws — which were perhaps just to be sought and narrowly interpreted as the ‘brute 
facts of Indigenous existence prior to contact’.80 Certainly section 35 carries a 
significant responsibility in contemporary Canadian law. Some have lamented that 
it ‘failed to reset the relationship between Indigenous peoples and the Crown’81 — 
                                            
74 Complicating factors (at least pre-Calder) included the interposition of the Royal Proclamation 
(conceptualised as both a source of Aboriginal interests and an expression of common law 
recognition), the difficulties of classifying colonies for reception of law purposes, and competing 
theories on whether Aboriginal title was sourced in customary law or in the fact of occupation. 
75 See broadly Alan Hanna, ‘Spaces for Sharing: Searching for Indigenous Law on the Canadian 
Legal Landscape’ (n 58) 152ff. 
76 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, ‘Honouring the Truth, Reconciling for the 
Future’ (n 11). 
77 The Commission itself had observed a range of traditional processes in its own procedure: see 
Law Reform Commission of Canada, Justice Within: Indigenous Legal Traditions (n 26); Kirsten 
Anker (n 30). 
78 See eg John Borrows, Recovering Canada: The Resurgence of Indigenous Law (University of 
Toronto Press 2002); and more recently, eg, 2016 special issues of the Windsor Yearbook of 
Access to Justice (vol 33) and the McGill Law Journal (vol 61). 
79 At least in the form of a personal jurisdiction over the participants involved: Alan Hanna, 
‘Spaces for Sharing: Searching for Indigenous Law on the Canadian Legal Landscape’ (n 58) 
137. 
80 Kirsten Anker (n 30) 25. 
81 See eg Brenda L Gunn, ‘Moving beyond Rhetoric: Working toward Reconciliation through Self-
Determination’ (2015) 38 Dalhousie LJ 238, 239. 
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or that the Supreme Court has demonstrated a ‘tenacious unwillingness to frame 
Aboriginal rights broadly’.82 Yet this is an evolving legal platform, and we will return 
later to see how it has fared.  
 
III. VANUATU HISTORY AND CONTEXT 
 
A. The Protectorate 
 
In Vanuatu, as in Canada, customary laws were in force before the arrival of 
foreigners, and continued to be practiced during the colonial era. The term 
‘colonial’ is used loosely here as Vanuatu was never a colony; it was originally 
governed by England and France under a Joint Naval Commission, by virtue of a 
Convention signed in 1887. Some of the earliest colonial constituent laws were 
made under the Crown’s prerogative powers. These usually consisted of a Royal 
Charter,83 Letters Patent84 and Royal instructions.85 However, due to the decline 
of the royal prerogative most constituent arrangements in Vanuatu were made or 
ratified by Order-in-Council, under the Foreign Jurisdiction Act 1890. This was 
expanded upon by an Anglo-French Protocol in 1906,86 and later replaced by an 
Anglo-French Protocol signed in 1914 and ratified in 1922.87 This arrangement 
was known as the ‘condominium’,88 nicknamed locally as the ‘pandemonium’.89 
The 1914 Protocol underpinned the system of government until independence in 
1980.  
 
Under the Protocol, the country was administered by two High 
Commissioners appointed by England and France.90 It established a Joint Court, 
with civil and criminal jurisdiction in cases between French citizens and British 
subjects, or optants,91 and between those categories and natives.92 England and 
France also established their own national courts.93 The Protocol provided for a 
hotchpot of laws. English legislation and case law applied to British subjects and 
                                            
82 Peter S Vicaire (n 48) 612-13, 659. See earlier John Borrows, ‘Indigenous Legal Traditions in 
Canada’ (n 7) vi. 
83 See, eg, Royal Charter establishing the colony of Fiji (UK), 2 January 1875. 
84 See, eg, Letters Patent constituting the office of Governor of Fiji (UK), 9 February 1929. 
85 See, eg, Royal instructions to the Governor of Fiji (UK), 9 February 1929. 
86 Protocol between Great Britain and France Respecting the New Hebrides, Great Britain-
France, signed 27 February 1906, [1906] PITSE 2 (entered into force 20 October 1906) (‘1906 
Protocol’) art 11(1); ratified by New Hebrides Order-in-Council 1907 (UK). 
87 Protocol between Great Britain and France Respecting the New Hebrides, Great Britain-
France, signed 6 August 1914 (entered into force 18 March 1922) (‘1914 Protocol’) art 8(6); New 
Hebrides Order-in-Council 1922 (UK). 
88 A term used to describe a country jointly controlled by two separate political powers. 
89 This term was coined by Father Walter Lini, the first Prime Minister of Vanuatu and used in the 
title of his book, Beyond Pandemonium: From the New Hebrides to Vanuatu (Asia Pacific Books 
1980). 
90 1914 Protocol, art 2.1. 
91 Individuals of other nationality who opted to come under British or French jurisdiction. Opting 
was compulsory for foreigners: 1914 Protocol, art 1.2. 
92 1914 Protocol, art 12. 
93 ibid art 20. 
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optants 94  and the French Civil Code applied to French citizens and optants 
(‘introduced laws’). Locally made ‘colonial laws’ included Queen's Regulations 
made by the High Commissioner or Resident Commissioner and French 
Regulations made by their counterpart (for their respective citizens and optants), 
together with Joint Regulations issued by the High Commissioners for the 
'maintenance of order and for the good government of the group, and for carrying 
the present Convention into effect’95 (applying to all inhabitants). 
 
The 1914 Protocol also provided that ‘native laws and customs ... where not 
contrary to the dictates of humanity and the maintenance of order shall be utilised 
for the preparation of a code of native law both civil and penal’.96 Codes were to 
be put in force region by region, administered by Native Courts.97 A Native Criminal 
Code was drawn up in 193898 and Courts established over the following years. No 
civil code was introduced, and the Criminal Code was impliedly repealed by the 
Penal Code Act99 (applicable to everyone). The Protocol made some provision for 
ascertaining custom through the employment of assessors, knowledgeable in 
custom, to sit with judges in the common law courts.100  
 
Alongside these provisions, traditional leaders were often encouraged by 
colonial administrators to enforce customary laws as a form of social control.101 
More particularly, the rules of customary land holding were left in place. The 
common law rule that radical title to land belonged to the Crown was not applied, 
and legislation provided that all land, including waste land, belonged to Indigenous 
people.102 However, during the period of dependency,103 sales of perpetual titles 
to land were permitted (with permission of the Joint Court).104  
 
B. Independence and Constitutional Recognition 
 
In the 1960s, disputes over land clearing for coconut plantations led to 
the emergence of ‘Nagriamel’, a protest and pro-independence movement led 
                                            
94 ibid art 13. 
95 ibid art 7. 
96 ibid art 8. 
97 Jurisdiction in such courts was defined in terms of civil and criminal jurisdiction, which was not 
a recognised distinction in customary law, see, eg, Joint Protocol 1914, art 8, para 7. A monetary 
limit was placed on civil claims and a seriousness and penalty limit on criminal cases. 
98 Joint Regulation 1/1938, later replaced by Native Criminal Code 1962 (Joint Regulation 
12/1962). 
99 Cap 135 (passed in 1981). 
100 1914 Protocol, art 11(1); 1914 Protocol, art 8(6). See now Island Courts Act [Cap 167] (Van) s 
22(2); Civil Procedure Rules 2002 (Van) rr 16.34(6), (7), 16.35(6), (7). 
101 See, eg, New Hebrides Order in Council 1922, sch, art 8. 
102 1906 Protocol, art 1; 1914 Protocol, art 1. 
103 ‘Dependency’ is a general term referring to a country that is under the political control of 
another whether as a colony, protectorate, protected state or condominium. 
104 1914 Protocol, art 12. 
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by Jimmy Stevens.105 Britain was in favour of granting independence, although 
not on the terms demanded.106 France was opposed, fearing pro-independence 
aspirations in their mineral-rich territory of New Caledonia.107 In the early 1970s 
the Vanua'aku Party was established, laying the seeds for a party system which 
has never completely ‘taken’ in Vanuatu.108 The Vanua’aku party steered the 
push for independence. Yet in June 1980, Jimmy Stevens led an uprising on 
Espirito Santo island, objecting to the terms on which independence was 
planned and the Vanua'aku Party’s dominance.109 The rebels declared Espiritu 
Santo’s independence. As neither France nor the United Kingdom sent troops, 
the uprising was quelled with assistance from Papua New Guinean soldiers.110 
 
In the meantime, on 30 July 1980, the country had become independent. 
The new Constitution was based on a Westminster parliamentary democracy.111 
However, the prevailing nationalism propelled customary laws to the top of the 
agenda and this was reflected in the aspirational prefatory part:112  
 
WE, the people of Vanuatu … CHERISHING our ethnic, linguistic and cultural 
diversity, 
MINDFUL at the same time of our common destiny, HEREBY proclaim the 
establishment of the united and free Republic of Vanuatu founded on traditional 
Melanesian values, faith in God, and Christian principles, AND for this purpose 
give ourselves this Constitution. 
 
In addition to these resounding words, the Constitution gave specific recognition 
to customary laws, both aspirationally and as a primary source of law rather than 
a subservient element of a common law system.113 Unfortunately, the complex 
                                            
105 See further, Howard Van Trease (n 19); Marc Tabani, ‘Political History of Nagriamel on 
Santo, Vanuatu’ (2008) 78(3) Oceania 332. 
106 Australian Department of Foreign Affairs, ‘New Hebrides: Australian Action and Initiatives,’ 
Cabinet Memorandum 829, 2. 
107 Steven R Fischer, A history of the Pacific Islands (Palgrave Macmillan 2002) 249-250.  
108 The increasingly ‘fractionalised’ party system has seen coalition governments become a 
permanent feature in Vanuatu and there were at least 16 changes of government between 1991 
and 2004: Jon Fraenkel, ‘Political Consequences of Pacific Island Electoral Laws’ (2005) 
Australian National University School of Pacific and Asia Studies Discussion Paper 8/2005, 7.  
109 Howard Van Trease (n 19) 247. 
110 The ‘coconut war’ as it was nicknamed, came to an end after Stevens' son was shot at a 
Papua New Guinean roadblock in late August 1980 and Stevens surrendered. Stevens 
remained in prison until 1991: Howard Van Trease (n 19) 258. 
111 Sam Alasia, ‘Party Politics and Government in Solomon Islands’ (1997) Australian National 
University School of Pacific and Asia Studies Discussion Paper 7/1997. 
112 This part of the Constitution is commonly referred to as a preamble, but as the paragraphs in 
question contain underlying principles and philosophies and use the words ‘declare’, ‘agree and 
pledge’ in capital letters, they might perhaps be more correctly referred to as the ‘Declaration, 
Agreement and Pledge’. The Court of Appeal of Solomon Islands has recently stated that the 
Preamble is a statement of national aspiration, without juridical force, providing guidance only: 
K'Clay v Attorney General (Unreported, Court of Appeal, Solomon Islands, Goldsbrough P, 
Williams, Ward, JJA, 9 May 2014) [15] available via www.paclii.org at [2014] SBCA 2. 
113 Kenneth Brown, ‘Customary Law in the Pacific: An Endangered Species’ (1999) 3 J South Pac 
Law, Art 2, 1.  
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challenges of such pluralism were largely unaddressed, leading to perplexing 
problems. In particular, the provisions generally applying customary laws are 
ambiguous. Article 95(3) states that customary laws ‘shall continue to have effect 
as part of the law of the Republic of Vanuatu.’ Article 47(1) states that: 
 
If there is no rule of law applicable to a matter before it, a court shall determine a 
matter according to substantial justice and whenever possible in conformity with 
custom. 
 
If this section is read to mean that custom is only to be considered if 
there is no rule of (state) law applicable, and where substantial justice permits, 
then it could be viewed as restricting the application of Article 95(3). However, 
Article 47 could be read together with Article 95(3) to mean that all decisions 
are to be made in conformity with any relevant custom, except where there is 
some specific reason making this impossible, for example where it conflicts with 
a fundamental right. Given the nationalism prevailing at Independence, it might 
seem likely that the Constitutional Drafting Committee intended this broader 
meaning. However, the key phrases appear almost as an afterthought, with an 
unclear relationship to the preceding words of the Articles.  
 
There are no express limitations placed on the application of customary 
laws in Article 95(3). However, as the Constitution is declared by Article 2 to be the 
supreme law of Vanuatu, customary laws are viewed as subject to its provisions, 
including the fundamental rights and duties in Chapter 2.114 The Constitution also 
authorises Parliament to enact legislation, and although it is not expressly 
stated, the courts view customary laws as subordinate to those Acts.115  
 
Further down the hierarchy, things become rather murky. Article 95(1) 
and (2) state that, until otherwise provided by Vanuatu’s Parliament, laws in force 
immediately before Independence continue to apply. As explained above, laws in 
force include colonial laws and introduced laws. Colonial laws apply ‘as if they 
had been made in pursuance of the Constitution’,116 which gives them the same 
status as Acts of Vanuatu’s Parliament and therefore appears to give them 
precedence over customary laws. Less certain is the relationship between 
customary laws and introduced laws.117 The Constitution provides that British 
and French laws118 ‘continue to apply to the extent that they are not expressly 
revoked or incompatible with the independent status of Vanuatu and wherever 
possible taking due account of custom.’ 119  Again, the reference to custom 
                                            
114 Public Prosecutor v Kota (1989-94) 2 Van LR 661. 
115 See, eg, Public Prosecutor v Kota (1989-94) 2 Van LR 661; Public Prosecutor v Silas 
(1993) 2 Van LR 659. 
116 Constitution of Vanuatu 1980, art 95(1). 
117 For further discussion of the relationship between customary law and the other laws in 
force in Vanuatu, see [reference deleted for author anonymity]. 
118 Whilst French civil law continues to apply, the predominance of the British administration at 
independence, discussed above, led to a common law framework of courts and adjectival laws. 
119 Constitution of Vanuatu 1980, art 95(2).  
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appears almost an afterthought and it is unclear whether introduced laws are 
to apply in preference to custom, or whether they must give way if incompatible 
with custom, unless there is some specific reason why this is not possible. 
Thus, the Constitution places customary laws in an uncertain position in the 
hierarchy and, as discussed later, the courts have been left to grapple with this.120 
 
Vanuatu’s Constitution goes further by providing for the inclusion of 
traditional leaders in national government through a National Council of chiefs (‘the 
Malvatumauri’).121 This is not a traditional body, but is composed of custom chiefs 
elected by their peers sitting in District Councils of Chiefs.122 The Malvatumauri 
determines its own procedure,123 but must meet at least annually.124 Opinions and 
votes in the Council are privileged. 125  The Malvatumauri has a general 
competence to discuss all matters relating to custom and tradition and may make 
recommendations for the preservation and promotion of Ni-Vanuatu culture and 
languages.126 It ‘may be consulted on any question, particularly any question 
relating to tradition and custom, in connection with any bill before Parliament.’127 
Article 31 provides that Parliament is to provide for the organisation of the 
Malvatumauri. Basic provision was made by the National Council of Chiefs 
(Organisation) Act 1985, including that ‘the rules, functions, duties and obligations 
of customary chiefs at village, island and regional levels’ were to be determined by 
the ‘customary law of Vanuatu in so far as it has not been repealed or modified by 
written law’.128 In 2006 a more elaborate framework was provided,129 under which 
the Malvatumauri became an umbrella body overseeing two other levels of 
councils, namely, the Island and Urban Councils of Chiefs. Between one and three 
Island Councils are established on each of Vanuatu’s Islands, and an urban council 
in Port Vila (the capital) and in Luganville (the main town on Espiritu Santo). The 
functions of the Councils (including resolution of disputes according to, and 
promotion of, custom) are carefully set out. 130  
 
The detail provided for the organisation of the Councils arguably takes them 
further away from traditional processes. For example, the Act provides for the 
                                            
120 For further discussion of the relationship between customary law and the other laws in 
force in Vanuatu, [reference deleted for author anonymity].  
121 Constitution of Vanuatu 1980, ch 5. The term ‘National Council of Chiefs’ was amended to 
‘Malvatumauri Council of Chiefs’ by Constitution (Sixth) (Amendment) Act 2013 (Van). 
122 Constitution of Vanuatu 1980, art 29(1). 
123 ibid art 29(2) 
124 ibid art 30. 
125 ibid art 32. 
126 ibid art 30(1). 
127 ibid art 30(2). 
128 National Council of Chiefs (Organisation) Act 1985 (Van) s 3. 
129 National Council of Chiefs Act 2006 (Van). 
130 ibid s 13(1): ‘(a) to resolve dispute according to local custom; (b) to prescribe the value of 
exchange of gift for a custom marriage; (c) to promote and encourage the use of custom and 
culture; (d) to promote peace, stability and harmony; (e) to promote and encourage sustainable 
social and economic development; (f) to undertake such other functions as are conferred on them 
under this Act or any other Act.’ 
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National Council to have an elected Chairperson and for the appointment of a Chief 
Executive officer.131 Elected positions and external appointments may be seen as 
running counter to Pacific traditions of consensus and compromise and a catalyst 
for social tensions. Some imposed procedures might be more appropriate than 
they first appear (e.g. election may accord with selection of chiefs on merit over 
lineage).132 Yet in broad terms introduced process very likely contributes to the 
reality, particularly in rural areas, that many communities live with little reference 
to laws and institutions beyond their custom. 
 
The Constitution enhances the Malvatumauri’s role by providing that 
Parliament must consult this body on certain customary land matters.133 This has 
recently been strengthened to require consultation before any change to Vanuatu’s 
land law.134 The Malvatumauri and Island Councils of Chiefs are also given a 
supervisory role in the land dispute resolution process.135  
 
In addition to these provisions and the general Articles 95 and 47, the Constitution 
makes special provision to ensure that land is governed by customary laws. Article 
73 provides that all land in the Republic belongs to the ‘custom owners’. Under 
Article 75 ‘[only] indigenous citizens … who have acquired their land in accordance 
with a recognised system of land tenure shall have perpetual ownership ...’. And 
while customary land may be transferred to other Ni-Vanuatu if customary laws 
permit, and provided the process accords with customary laws,136 transfers to non-
Indigenous citizens or to foreigners are only allowed in the form of a lease.137 
Further, land transactions between an Indigenous citizen and a non-Indigenous 
citizen or non-citizen are only permitted with government consent.138 Consent is 
prohibited if the transaction is prejudicial to indigenous or national interests.139 As 
a result of these provisions, 98% of land is under customary tenure.140 Article 74 
provides that ‘the rules of custom shall form the basis of ownership and use of 
land’. Accordingly, disputes concerning customary land are to be determined in 
accordance with customary laws. However, land disputes are common and, as 
discussed further below, the pathways for resolving these have been a subject of 
contention.  
 
                                            
131 ibid ss 6 and 15. 
132 The existence of the chiefly system in Vanuatu is itself a matter of dispute: See, eg, Lissant 
Bolton, Unfolding the Moon: Enacting Women’s Kastom in Vanuatu (University of Hawai’i Press 
2003) 69.  
133 Constitution of Vanuatu 1980, art 76. 
134 ibid art 30. 
135 Customary Land Management Act 2013 (Van) s 7. 
136 Constitution of Vanuatu 1980, art 74. 
137 Land Leases Act 1983 [Cap 163] (Van). 
138 Constitution of Vanuatu 1980, art 79(1). 
139 ibid art 79(2): ‘i.e., ‘prejudicial to the interests of (a) the custom owner or owners of the land; 
(b) the Indigenous citizen where he is not the custom owner; (c) the community in whose locality 
the land is situated; or (d) the Republic of Vanuatu.’ 
140 AusAID (ed), Making Land Work (AusAID 2008) vol 1, 4. 
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Whilst the Constitution declared the State to be founded on traditional 
Melanesian values and afforded some recognition to customary laws, as with 
Canada the difficult detail was largely left aside, in this case to be pursued by 
Parliament. The Constitution141 provides in Article 51 that: 
 
Ascertainment of rules of custom 
(1) Parliament may provide for the manner of the ascertainment of relevant rules 
of custom except for the rules of custom relating to ownership of custom land, 
and may in particular provide for persons knowledgeable in such custom to sit 
with the judges of the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeal and take part in its 
proceedings. 
 
As in Canada progress was slow; until recently little action had been 
taken to realise this provision. The parliamentary mandate was pursued only to 
provide for assessors knowledgeable in custom to sit with judges in the common 
law courts142 (a practice which already existed under the old Protocols), and to 
provide the courts with such incidental power ‘as may be reasonably required 
in order to apply custom’. In 2006, the provision regarding assessors was 
repealed,143 although the Island Courts Act still requires the Supreme Court to sit 
with assessors in appeals from Island Courts. 144  For over three decades, no 
attempt was made to address the more complex issue of how the ‘relevant rules 
of custom’ should be ascertained. As in Canada this fell to the courts in a 
necessarily ad hoc manner. Vanuatu’s Parliament has recently passed 
controversial legislation dealing with ascertaining rules of custom, but only in 
relation to customary land. As discussed later, the legislation purports to return all 
decision making on land to customary forums.145   
 
IV. THE INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF 
CANADIAN ‘ABORIGINAL RIGHTS’ 
 
The Canadian constitutional recognition and affirmation of ‘existing Aboriginal 
rights’ (in s 35 of the Constitution Act 1982) was first explored in a series of 
fisheries prosecutions in the 1990s. Most importantly, in the 1996 decision of R v 
Van der Peet,146 Lamer CJC147 expounded that in order to be an ‘Aboriginal right’ 
protected by section 35 ‘an activity must be an element of a practice, custom or 
tradition integral to the distinctive [pre-contact] culture of the Aboriginal group 
claiming the right’.148 With this complex formula the Canadian courts set out to 
                                            
141 As amended in 2013: Constitution (Sixth) (Amendment) Act 2013 (Van) s 17. 
142 Courts Act Cap 122 (Van) s 14. 
143 Judicial Services and Courts Act 2006 (Van). 
144 Island Courts Act Cap 167 (Van) s 22(2). See also Civil Procedure Rules, Cap 270 (Van) r 
16.34(6)(a). 
145 Customary Land Management Act 2013 (Van). 
146 R v Van der Peet (1996) 137 DLR (4th) 289. 
147 La Forest, Sopinka, Gonthier, Cory, Iacobucci and Major JJ concurring. 
148 R v Van der Peet (1996) 137 DLR (4th) 289, 310 (bracketed note added based on surrounding 
discussion in the judgment). For later restatements of the test, see, eg, Minister of National 
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navigate the modern confluence of legal systems. As we noted at the outset, this 
recent Canadian history is an important case study on the challenges of legal 
pluralism. 
 
A. The assembly and application of the Van der Peet test 
 
The Supreme Court’s first close examination of section 35 came in the 1990 
decision of R v Sparrow149 — a case concerning government power to regulate 
fishing by net length restrictions. The case focussed primarily on possible 
extinguishment or infringement of the Aboriginal rights in issue, clarifying that the 
new constitutional protection meant that any post section 35 ‘infringement’ of 
‘rights’ (and attendant traditions) must be ‘justified’ by reference to an exacting 
standard. Yet the broader difficulty of this legal confluence was already apparent. 
First, the Court largely avoided difficult questions about the evolution and modern 
exercise of Aboriginal traditions.150 Secondly, the reasoning raised the possibility 
that the constitutional protection covered only a subset of traditions (i.e. ‘integral’ 
ones). And thirdly, while the Court explained that the ambiguous word ‘existing’ in 
section 35(1) means ‘unextinguished’,151 it has noted that this effectively consigns 
Aboriginal peoples and their rights to a ‘frozen lake with two air holes placed 
centuries apart’ — all rights were forcibly submerged for generations and only 
those that have made it to the second hole have now been recognised.152 The 
Court was already grappling here with some of the key challenges identified at the 
beginning of this paper. 
 
In the critical decision of Van der Peet, one of a 1996 trilogy,153 Lamer 
CJC154 built his ‘integral to distinctive culture’ test upon terminology from Sparrow 
and what he saw to be the ‘purpose’ of section 35 — namely:    
 
…the protection and reconciliation [with Crown sovereignty] of the interests which 
arise from the fact that prior to the arrival of Europeans in North America Aboriginal 
peoples lived on the land in distinctive societies, with their own practices, customs 
and traditions.155  
 
Lamer CJC felt that the test for section 35 Aboriginal rights must seek the 
‘crucial elements’ of those pre-existing distinctive societies — i.e. the practices, 
                                            
Revenue v Mitchell (2001) 199 DLR (4th) 385 per McLachlin CJC at 400; and R v Sappier; R v 
Gray (2006) 274 DLR (4th) 75 (discussed below).  
149 R v Sparrow (1990) 70 DLR (4th) 385. 
150 ibid 402-3 (only food fishing was directly in issue). 
151 It did not mean to constitutionalise the regulations of 1982 and ‘freeze’ Aboriginal rights by 
reference to them: R v Sparrow (1990) 70 DLR (4th) 385, 396. 
152 Peter S Vicaire (n 48) 655. 
153 See also R v NTC Smokehouse Ltd (1996) 137 DLR (4th) 528; and R v Gladstone (1996) 137 
DLR (4th) 648. See further R v Cote (1996) 138 DLR (4th). 
154 With whom La Forest, Sopinka, Gonthier, Cory, Iacobucci and Major JJ concurred. 
155 R v Van der Peet (1996) 137 DLR (4th) 289, 303, cf 309-10.  
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customs and traditions ‘central’ to the pre-contact156 Aboriginal cultures.157 The 
resulting ‘integral to distinctive culture’ test was, then, a quite historically-focused 
recognition of some traditional practices and attendant laws.   
 
There were alternative views about the appropriate constitutional 
‘reconciliation’. L’Heureux-Dubè J viewed the purpose of section 35 more as 
cultural and societal preservation, and hence focussed the test on the social and 
cultural significance of a practice, tradition or custom.158 Her Honour was critical of 
a point in time (‘frozen right’) approach — preferring to require the activity to have 
been sufficiently significant and fundamental to the culture and social organisation 
of the group for a substantial continuous period of time.159 McLachlin J sought to 
avoid ‘freezing’ rights by distinguishing between general ancestral rights and their 
modern exercise,160 and requiring (without reference to dates) continuity between 
the modern practice and the laws and customs that ‘held sway’ before European 
ones.161   
 
Difficult questions obviously arise about what is ‘integral’ or ‘significant’ and 
by whose measure. Moreover, the cogitation here on the temporal source, baseline 
scope and/or adaptability of ‘rights’ is important as regards the nature of section 
35’s engagement with customary laws; is it seeking and preserving just the 
practices of pre-contact existence, or is it more fully recognising the customary 
laws and processes themselves? A broader definition of the ‘ancestral right’, or 
flexibility on the period of inquiry, avoids rather than answers this.     
 
Lamer CJC’s ‘integral to distinctive culture’ test was confirmed and 
elucidated by majorities in two cases accompanying Van der Peet — R v NTC 
Smokehouse and R v Gladstone. 162  These three cases illustrate well the 
complexity and potential controversy of the test. The claims were characterised as 
assertions of a right to exchange fish (salmon or herring spawn) for money or other 
goods — however in Gladstone a broader ‘commercial’ classification was 
considered in the alternative.163 Only in Gladstone was the claimed right (in fact 
                                            
156 As to adaptation of the ‘pre-contact’ test for Métis claimants: see esp R v Powley (2003) 230 
DLR (4th) 1.  
157 R v Van der Peet (1996) 137 DLR (4th) 289, 309-10. 
158 ibid 343-5. 
159 ibid 349. 
160 ibid 370-1, 373-4; cf also L’Heureux-Dubè J at 341-2. Lamer CJC himself noted that the 
particular action in question should be considered at a general level, and that the action may be 
the exercise in a ‘modern’ form of a pre-contact practice, tradition or custom: at 312-13. 
161 ibid, 373. Note the Supreme Court’s return to some aspects of these minority opinions in R v 
Sappier; R v Gray (2006) 274 DLR (4th) 75 (discussed below). 
162 R v NTC Smokehouse Ltd (1996) 137 DLR (4th) 528; R v Gladstone (1996) 137 DLR (4th) 
648.   
163 In Van der Peet the action in question was the sale of 10 salmon for $50 (considered not 
‘commercial’) — characterised by Lamer CJC as the assertion of a right to exchange fish for 
money or other goods (which was sufficient to potentially impugn the government prohibition on 
all sale or trade of fish (at 321)). In NTC Smokehouse, the sale of 119,000 pounds of salmon by 
80 group members was considered ‘much closer’ to ‘commerce’ but still notionally characterised 
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both classifications) found to be an element of a practice, custom or tradition 
integral to the distinctive pre-contact culture of the group.164 It was emphasised 
(given there had also been pre-contact exchanges in the other cases) that it must 
be one of the things that ‘truly made the society what it was’, as opposed to 
incidental or occasional activities.165 
  
A fourth decision in 1996, R v Pamajewon,166 concerned an asserted right 
to operate and regulate high stakes gambling on a reservation — and therefore 
raised difficult questions of customary law recognition and self-governance more 
directly.167 The Court was prepared to assume (without deciding) that section 35 
could include rights of ‘self-government’, but found that the specific rights asserted 
here were not made out on the evidence and the exacting Van der Peet test.168           
 
Canadian government policy later recognised an ‘inherent right of self-
government’ as a potential section 35 right (with cross-reference to Van der Peet 
language), and that such a right ‘may find expression in treaties’ and ‘in the context 
of the Crown’s relationship with treaty First Nations’.169 Yet this policy, although 
laudably driven by the goals of building stronger communities and dismantling old 
Indian Act restrictions, was the product of years of contention and was carefully 
hedged. The recognition of self-government over the ‘special relationship’ to land 
and resources was (by glossary) limited essentially to reserve and relevant 
agreement lands (as opposed to traditional lands more broadly); the right to self-
government was said to operate within the constitutional ‘framework’ and therefore 
required harmonious ‘cooperative arrangements’ with other governments; and this 
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164 R v Van der Peet (1996) 137 DLR (4th) 289, 313-14, 315.  And see generally Van der Peet at 
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right was said not to include a ‘right of sovereignty’ in the international law sense.170 
As noted earlier in this paper, broad or specific self-government agreements can 
be negotiated as part of a larger comprehensive land claim process,171 or as a 
stand-alone agreement (often in the context of a reserve).172   
 
The controversies of Van der Peet returned to the Supreme Court in 2006. 
In R v Sappier173 ‘Aboriginal rights’ had been raised in defence to prosecutions for 
unlawful cutting of timber. The Crown argued that while pre-contact timber usage 
may have been important for survival it was not established to be a defining 
practice, custom or tradition that ‘truly made the society what it was’.174 Yet the 
Court, 175  having characterised the claimed right as one to harvest wood for 
domestic uses,176 was prepared to infer from evidence on the importance of the 
resource that the practice of harvesting was also significant.177 Notably, it rejected 
the view that practices merely for ‘survival’ could not satisfy Van der Peet178 – in 
the process revisiting comments in earlier decisions. 179  The Court was also 
concerned this time to accommodate ‘evolution’ of activities — to not ‘freeze the 
right in its pre-contact form’.180 Here, the right to harvest wood was allowed to 
evolve into a right to harvest wood by modern means for modern dwellings.181    
 
The outer edges of section 35 were found again in the 2011 case of Lax 
Kw'alaams Indian Band v Canada (Attorney General). 182  In response to an 
assertion of fishing rights on the northwest coast, the Court held that the 
established practices, customs and traditions of the pre-contact society did not 
support a contemporary right to broad commercial fishing: the sporadic historical 
                                            
170 Recent statements of policy – in the form of Attorney General ‘Principles’ and ‘Directives’ – are 
discussed below. 
171 See eg Nisga’a Final Agreement 11 May 2000 and the decisions of Campbell v British 
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trade in fish (bar one specific product) was found to be peripheral and non-
defining.183 It was noted that while evolution was possible (in subject matter and 
method),184 the modern claim as framed lacked ‘continuity and proportionality’ — 
being qualitatively and quantitatively different to the pre-contact trade.185 A late-
added lesser claim (framed in terms of a right to a ‘prosperous economy’) was 
rejected for both substantive and procedural reasons,186 and the residual claim to 
a fishery for ‘food, social and ceremonial’ purposes was considered uncontentious 
and not worthy of any declaration.187  
 
The legal and moral logic of the ‘integral to distinctive culture’ test has been 
hotly debated; key concerns being its propensity to ‘moor’ Aboriginal rights to the 
past and its awkward search for the ‘integral’ features of ‘distinctive’ cultures.188 
Most importantly, these cases illustrate well some of the intractable difficulties of 
legal pluralism in operation — and the added challenges of constitutional context. 
The courts were given no map for this legal journey, and they candidly pursued a 
controversial compromise in the constitutional provisions.   
 
B. The recovery of ‘Aboriginal title’ 
 
One year after Van der Peet, the Supreme Court carved out of the new ‘Aboriginal 
rights’ methodology a revised notion of ‘Aboriginal title’. Delgamuukw v British 
Columbia,189 concerned a more comprehensive claim than the fisheries cases. 
Lamer CJC190 explained that common law Aboriginal title is protected ‘in its full 
form’ by section 35(1)191 — as a distinct species of ‘Aboriginal right’ arising from a 
sufficiently significant connection with land.192 It is established, essentially, upon 
proof of exclusive occupation (by reference to physical occupation and systems of 
Aboriginal law) at the point of acquisition of sovereignty.193 And this title confers a 
right to the land itself (and its use for a variety of purposes), subject to the limitation 
that uses must not be ‘irreconcilable’ with the nature of the attachment to the 
land.194  
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187 ibid [14]. 
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Aboriginal law has a conspicuous role in this formula, albeit a somewhat ill-
defined one.195 Inevitably the courts have wrestled with the challenges of pluralism 
in this context also. The ‘irreconcilable uses’ limitation, drawn in part from 
constitutional ‘purpose’ and so an awkward overlay on common law principle,196 
was considered by some key observers to be somewhat preservationist and 
paternalistic.197 When the Supreme Court itself returned to this issue in 2014,198 it 
was careful to emphasise that this restriction emerged from the ‘collective’ nature 
of Aboriginal title, which is held for the present and all succeeding generations.199 
 
A more significant dilemma emerged around the assessment of original 
‘occupation’ and ‘exclusivity’ under the Delgamuukw test, and particularly the 
extent to which Aboriginal laws and perspectives influence that assessment. 
Lamer CJC in Delgamuukw was ostensibly relativist in his approach (reminiscent 
of early US cases) — accommodating the potential selectivity and intermittency of 
traditional land use200 and noting the need to seek ‘exclusivity’ with sensitivity to 
Aboriginal perspectives.201 In the 2005 decision of R v Marshall; R v Bernard,202 a 
Supreme Court majority203 cast doubt on this flexibility, apparently drawing the test 
back towards the tighter inquiries associated with general law ‘possession’ (such 
that seasonal hunting and fishing might typically translate as ‘rights’ rather than 
‘title’).204 Yet there was equivocation in this decision; the majority also emphasised 
the importance of the Aboriginal perspective (and specific land and group 
characteristics), and the imprecision of notions of ‘exclusivity’.205   
 
The sequel to Delgamuukw was a long time coming, but in the interim the 
controversy around assessment of original ‘exclusive occupation’ (and the role of 
Aboriginal laws and perspectives) steadily grew. Ultimately this emerged squarely 
in the 2014 decision of Tsilhqot’in v British Columbia.206 The Supreme Court207 
rejected a strict view that would result in only small pockets of ‘title’ surrounded by 
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larger areas supporting only Van der Peet style specific ‘rights’. According to the 
Court, title could be established by proof of regular and exclusive use of territory 
(as opposed to intensive use of definite tracts with defined boundaries) — and this 
was to be assessed with due attention to Aboriginal culture and practices and 
might include tracts regularly used for hunting and fishing (etc) and over which the 
group exercised effective control. 208  This is a significant show of respect for 
Aboriginal histories, practices and attendant laws; Tsilhqot’in law was a ‘key 
ingredient’ in the case in the assessment of use and occupation.209 The decision 
was of enormous significance for the non-treaty regions of Canada (particularly 
British Columbia).   
 
C. The section 35 protection 
 
The broader dilemma thrown up by section 35 related to the nature of protection 
afforded to recognised ‘Aboriginal rights’ (and title). In the first place, as section 35 
was located in Part II of the Constitution Act, it was apparently free of the 
‘reasonable limits’ qualification and legislative override provisions applying to the 
new Charter of Rights and Freedoms (in Part I).210 And section 25 (in Part 1) further 
provided that the Charter guarantees ‘shall not be construed so as to abrogate or 
derogate from any aboriginal, treaty or other rights or freedoms that pertain to the 
aboriginal peoples of Canada’.211 The Charter principles of course reflect some of 
the more sacrosanct tenets of western law, and not surprisingly there has since 
been cogitation on whether section 25 should operate as an ‘absolute bar’ to 
Charter-based challenges to section 35 rights — or merely as an interpretative 
provision informing the construction of potentially conflicting rights. In the Supreme 
Court’s own brief consideration,212 it was said that ‘these issues raise complex 
questions of the utmost importance to the peaceful reconciliation of Aboriginal 
entitlements with the interests of all Canadians… best left for resolution on a case-
by-case basis’.213 
 
Beyond this lingering structural uncertainty, bigger questions about the 
nature of section 35’s protection produced the most significant constitutional 
‘compromise’ forged by the courts. The 1990 Sparrow decision had laid down a 
broad requirement that a post section 35 ‘infringement’ of these rights, once 
identified, must be ‘justified’. This entailed establishing a ‘valid legislative objective’ 
for the infringement, and that action was consistent with the ‘special trust 
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relationship’ between the Crown and Aboriginal peoples (which would turn upon 
questions of proportionality, compensation, consultation, and priority in any 
conservation measures).214 This initial test attracted controversy, but moreover it 
is often argued that in later cases the bar for ‘justification’ was noticeably 
lowered.215 In Gladstone216 and Delgamuukw,217 the Sparrow notion of priority 
was diluted,218 and what had been a search for a ‘compelling and substantial’ 
legislative objective (e.g., conservation or public safety) appeared to be eroded to 
one satisfied by industry or infrastructure development projects and general 
economic expansion.219 In Delgamuukw, Lamer CJC again referred to section 35’s 
purpose of ‘reconciling’ prior Aboriginal occupation with Crown sovereignty in 
supporting the broadening approach.220 
 
Yet this issue, going to the priority accorded to the western law’s own central 
purposes, proved not to be settled. According to the Supreme Court in 
Tsilhqot’in, 221  absent consent from Aboriginal title holders 222  ‘justification’ of 
incursion on title land would require the Crown to establish: 1) a proper discharge 
of its duty to consult and accommodate; 2) a compelling and substantial objective; 
and 3) consistency with the Crown’s fiduciary obligation toward the group.223 The 
first mentioned duty arises even where the Crown has just actual or constructive 
knowledge of the potential existence of Aboriginal title 224 (albeit that it varies 
according to the strength of the claim and seriousness of potential impact).225 
Further, and importantly, the ‘compelling and substantial objective’ must be 
considered from the Aboriginal perspective as well as that of the broader public.226 
Moreover, the Court said that the fiduciary obligation requires the Crown to respect 
the group and cross-generational nature of the title interest, and imports an 
obligation of ‘proportionality’ in the justification process.227 These are significant 
hurdles for the Crown in any attempt to ‘justify’ infringement of Aboriginal title — 
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and the inter-generational equity that apparently underpins the ‘irreconcilable uses’ 
limit on Aboriginal title now appears to confine both parties.228   
 
There was, however, a significant addendum to the Court’s revitalisation of 
the ‘infringement/justification’ test. It was decided that this regime applied to (and 
could be utilised for) provincial as well as federal infringement.229 This has been 
controversial: seen by some to dismantle an important institutional buffer for 
Aboriginal communities,230 yet by others as recognition of Aboriginal decision-
making authority as against both levels of government.231 Certainly the decision 
has prompted some ‘government to government’ style interaction between the 
province and community in this case.232    
 
The ‘duty to consult’, refined and formalised in the Tsilhqot’in decision,233 
has become a lynchpin in the implementation of the constitutional compromise and 
navigation of competing legal perspectives. In this regard the courts have been 
called upon to consider further questions about whether breach of the duty can be 
relied on by individuals,234 whether the duty applies at the law-making stage,235 
the reach of the duty and its ‘triggers’, the means and bodies by which the Crown 
can fulfil the duty, and the standard of consultation required.236 There has also 
been related refinement and delimitation of the fiduciary duty owed by the 
government in certain contexts, and the broader responsibilities arising from the 
‘honour of the Crown’.237 
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As alluded to above, by the time of Tsilhqot’in the principles around 
Aboriginal title were building towards a species of self-government or 
‘jurisdiction’.238 Aboriginal title now supports a range of uses over robustly-defined 
portions of traditional territory, with associated rights of collective decision-making 
over lands and resources,239 and triggers nation-to-nation style engagement with 
governments in the context of infringement. With the Tsilhqot’in decision, and 
indeed growing political affirmation of the need for recognition, respect, co-
operation and partnership (as reflected in recent Principles and Directives),240 the 
country is at the top of a significant step forward in the meaningful accommodation 
of customary laws and processes — however clearly the challenges in this field 
are complex, and progress is always precarious.  
 
 
V. THE INTERPRETATION AMD IMPLEMENTATION OF 
VANUATU’S CONSTITUTIONAL RECOGNITION 
 
A. The Implementation of Recognition Provisions 
 
The problematic task of deciphering the constitutional recognition provisions 
has similarly been left to the courts in Vanuatu. Here we examine how the courts 
have approached the issues, commencing with the decision in Banga v Waiwo.241 
This case has been extensively traversed elsewhere,242 but given that for some 
time it stood alone in its detailed consideration of customary laws in common law 
proceedings, it remains an important starting point. At first instance,243 Lunabek 
Senior Magistrate (‘SM’) was called upon to determine the ‘damages’ for adultery 
to be paid to a spouse under the Matrimonial Causes Act.244 The SM was faced 
with the complex hierarchy of laws laid down by the Constitution, and took the 
opportunity to review the place of custom. Acknowledging the Preamble, which 
founded Vanuatu society on ‘traditional Melanesian values’, he interpreted Article 
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95(2) 245 as restricting the continued application of British and French law to British 
and French subjects. He concluded that it did not apply to Ni-Vanuatu,246 who were 
only subject to legislation passed by the Parliament of Vanuatu or declared by 
Vanuatu courts. If no such law existed, then customary laws would apply.247 In this 
case, given the seriousness of adultery under customary laws, he awarded 
punitive damages. 248  Acknowledging the potential challenges of accurately 
ascertaining relevant customary laws, the SM noted (at least) that the court should 
not be bound to ‘observe strict legal procedure or apply technical rules of 
evidence’, but should consider all relevant evidence, including hearsay and 
opinion, and otherwise inform itself as it saw fit.249  
 
Lunabek SM also considered the important question of how local variations 
were to be accommodated when multiple groups are involved. With increased 
mobility and inter-marriage, this is an important question for the courts. The SM 
suggested that where Ni-Vanuatu parties came from areas with different customs 
the court should search for a ‘common basis or foundation’ and turn that shared 
foundation into a rule.250 Where only one of the parties was Ni-Vanuatu the court 
should consider both any applicable British or French law and applicable 
customary laws and ‘apply the law relevant to the case.’251 However, he did not 
expand on how that relevance might be determined. An answer may be found in 
the Underlying Law Act of Papua New Guinea, the successor to the Customs 
Recognition Act, which states that in deciding on which customary law to apply, 
‘the court shall have regard to (a) the place and nature of the transaction, act or 
event; and (b) the nature of residence of the parties.’252 
 
This decision was appealed to the Supreme Court.253 Whilst agreeing that 
Vanuatu’s Matrimonial Causes Act should be interpreted differently from its English 
counterparts, and that punitive damages were available, Chief Justice Vaudin 
d’Imecourt disagreed with the reasoning underpinning the lower decision. His 
Honour contended that the constitutional drafters must have intended equality 
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before the law,254 and so Article 95(2) should be read as making British and French 
laws applicable to everyone in Vanuatu after independence. The Chief Justice held 
that the common law courts should use custom ‘only in the event that there was 
no rule of law applicable to a matter before it.’255 He justified this marginalisation 
by pointing out that custom varied widely across Vanuatu (not commenting directly 
on Lunabek SM’s suggested way of dealing with conflicts), and that customary 
laws were difficult to ascertain because they were unwritten and judges and 
magistrates were not experts in all or any of the customs applying across 
Vanuatu.256 On the question of proof, the Chief Justice observed only that although 
there might not be a need for strict rules, ‘if and when the need arises to establish 
a particular custom, evidence must, nevertheless, be obtained and a clear custom 
must be established.’257 
 
While the lack of Parliamentary provision on the application of unwritten and 
diverse customary laws does indeed make its application more complex, that does 
not overcome the apparent flaw in the Chief Justice’s reasoning. This narrow view 
of Article 95(3) relegates customary laws to a law of last resort. This betrays the 
constitutional aspirations set out in the Preamble,258 and ignores what was argued 
earlier to be the natural reading of Article 47(1), taken in context, requiring a court 
to determine matters ‘whenever possible in conformity with custom.’ 
 
Lunabek SM later became Chief Justice of Vanuatu, leaving Pacific 
scholars eager for a case requiring reconsideration of these issues to come before 
him. Whilst this has yet to occur, the place of customary laws in the hierarchy was 
considered very recently by another Supreme Court judge. This case, PP v Leo,259 
is a rare example of a clear claim that the traditional system should prevail over 
the state system. The defendant was a chief and leader of the Tauraga Movement 
in North-Eastern Pentecost, an island far removed from the capital. He pleaded 
not guilty to charges of criminal misconduct including threatening to kill, malicious 
damage and arson – which arose from an incident in his village. As chief he had 
placed a gorogoro (ban) on collecting seafood from an area within the village 
boundary. Two villagers were accused of breaking this. According to the 
prosecution they denied this but nevertheless went to offer the defendant a tusked 
pig by way of apology, in response to which he allegedly berated them and took a 
shovel to their houses, threatening to shoot them if they did not leave the village. 
The villagers and their families abandoned their belongings and fled, following 
which the defendant and his followers allegedly looted and/or burnt their houses 
and gardens. In defence, it was contended that after the gorogoro was broken a 
customary court of five chiefs was convened and had imposed a customary penalty 
of 5,000 pigs, and that in default the villagers were to leave voluntarily or, as a last 
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resort, by a custom eviction. The defendant argued that as the fine was not paid 
and the villagers did not leave, what followed was all a part of the customary 
eviction process. 
 
At a preliminary hearing, the defence argued that as the actions had been 
taken by the customary court, in accordance with customary laws, they were not 
justiciable under Vanuatu’s written laws. The prosecution countered that the Court 
clearly had jurisdiction under the Penal Code. This led the Court again to questions 
about the hierarchy of laws in this legally and historically complex context. Wiltens 
J held that the Supreme Court did have jurisdiction, relying on Articles 47260 and 
49261 of the Constitution, s 28 of the Judicial Services and Courts Act,262 and s 1 
of the Penal Code.263 He concluded that, in the light of Article 47, the Court was 
compelled to determine the case according to law, which he took to mean the 
written law (for criminal acts the Penal Code and the Criminal Procedure Code). 
Wiltens J echoed the views of d’Imecourt CJ in Banga, stating ‘[c]ustomary 
considerations would only be a factor in the Supreme Court’s considerations if 
there were no rules of law applicable to what it was determining’. However, His 
Honour went further in his relegation of customary laws: 
 
Of the three bases on which the Court must make a determination, customary 
considerations are the least significant or compelling. The most compelling basis 
requires the Court to determine the matter in accordance with law; if no rules of 
law are in place, then the next basis of determination is substantial justice. If the 
matter is to be determined on the basis of natural justice, it is only then, if possible, 
that conformity with custom is to be considered.264 
 
Thus, customary laws were not only relegated to the lowest position in the 
hierarchy, but also were to be taken into account only ‘if possible’, to interpret or 
apply substantial justice in a way which conformed with custom. 
 
His Honour went on to deal with Article 95(3), which defence counsel 
appears to have suggested gave customary laws precedence over ‘pre-
independence foreign laws’.265 As the Penal Code is a post-independence Act of 
Vanuatu Parliament, it is hard to see how this advanced the case and Wiltens J 
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expressed himself to be unclear on this point.266 However, he went on to deliver a 
further blow to the status of customary laws: 
 
Article 95 of the Constitution was inserted … to deal with transitional matters. What 
it plainly says is that customary law will continue to have effect as part of the laws 
of Vanuatu. Pre-independence, customary law played a relatively minor part in the 
way the laws were administered. Some thirty-eight years later, that continues to 
be the position. Article 95 was not ever intended to give greater prominence to 
customary considerations – just to maintain the status quo. 
 
There has been no diminution of significance; neither has customary law taken on 
added significance; except in one area and that relates to ownership and use of 
land. Had Parliament wished, customary law in the area of alleged criminal 
misconduct could also have been devolved to the Chiefs – that has not occurred. 
There cannot be a clearer message of Parliament’s intent than 38 years of silence 
in the face of many calls for change.267 
  
This highlights the difficulties of giving meaning to broad recognition 
provisions in a constitution. In historical context the suggestion that Article 95 was 
only intended to be transitional and/or maintain the status quo is extraordinary. In 
fact, the reference to parliamentary intent is itself out of place in the interpretation 
of a constitution prepared by a Constitutional Committee,268 and introduced by an 
exchange of notes between the two ruling colonial powers.269 Equally problematic 
is the suggestion that Parliamentary inaction is evidence of a positive intention to 
marginalise customary laws. It seems more likely that this complex issue has for 
years occupied the ‘too hard basket’. Further, in recent times, Parliament has taken 
action to respond to the ‘many calls for change’ acknowledged above. Whilst this 
related to land270 rather than crime, that initial focus is explained by the fact that 
there is a specific constitutional mandate relating to customary land,271 and it has 
long been at the top of the reform agenda. 272  The case also highlights the 
existence of a ‘hybrid political order’ in Vanuatu,273 particularly in rural areas where 
communities often live largely by customary practice and norms, under traditional 
institutions, with minimal reference to introduced versions. 
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The Supreme Court has also imposed a broader limitation on the application 
of customary laws. In the 2011 decision of Chief Poilapa v Masaai,274 the question 
arose whether the Court had jurisdiction to determine a dispute as to paramount 
chiefly title. The matter came on appeal from the Magistrates Court (upholding an 
Island Court decision on applicable custom). The Supreme Court has jurisdiction 
to hear appeals the Magistrates Court on questions of law, questions of fact, or 
questions of mixed law and fact.275 Spear J held, without reference to Article 95, 
that he had no jurisdiction as custom did not come within any of those categories.  
Yet if customary law is neither law nor fact, nor a combination of the two, what 
exactly is it? Such confusion is not conducive to a meaningful accommodation of 
customary perspectives. Spear J’s reasoning was not entirely clear. However, it 
seems that either the decision was made per incuriam on the basis of failure to 
take into account Article 95, or his Honour was distinguishing custom, as defined 
in the Interpretation Act,276 from customary laws. As His Honour noted, the Act 
defines custom to mean ‘the customs and traditional practices of the Indigenous 
peoples of Vanuatu’.277 He did refer to Article 47(1), but appears to have been of 
the view that this only permitted orders relating to custom in exceptional 
circumstances.278Like the Supreme Court’s decisions in Banga v Waiwo,279 and 
PP v Leo,280 this approach seems to ignore the aspirations in the prefatory part of 
the Constitution and fails to give full effect to the clear mandate in Article 95(3) that 
‘customary law shall continue to have effect as part of the law’. Even if customary 
‘laws’ were somehow not at issue in this case, custom would surely be within the 
jurisdiction of the court as a question of fact. 
 
 
B. The Implementation of Recognition Provisions Relating to Customary Land 
 
As noted in PP v Leo, customary laws have added significance in relation to land. 
The Constitution provides that ‘the rules of custom shall form the basis of 
ownership and use of land’, 281  but it did not originally provide where or how 
disputes should be resolved. In broad terms, where traditional leaders have been 
able to decide matters, the State has not interfered. Indeed, until repealed,282 the 
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Customary Land Tribunal Act 2001 included some express, pragmatic deference 
to actual customary resolutions.283 
 
However, as chiefs’ decisions proved to be unacceptable to the ‘losing’ party with 
increasing frequency,284 Parliament has made a number of attempts to provide 
avenues (outside of the common law courts) for disputes to be dealt with in 
accordance with customary laws. These efforts are a somewhat unique example 
of concerted parliamentary pursuit of constitutional promises of recognition. 
Originally, customary land disputes were dealt with through Island Courts, 285 
established throughout Vanuatu by Chief Justice’s warrant286 and constituted by 
‘not less than three justices knowledgeable in custom … at least one of whom shall 
be a custom chief residing within the territorial jurisdiction of the court’.287 Island 
Courts decide cases in accordance with the ‘customary law prevailing within the 
territorial jurisdiction of the court so far as the same is not in conflict with any written 
law and is not contrary to justice, morality and good order’.288 One problem was 
that this placed Island Courts at the bottom of the hierarchy, marking customary 
cases as less important. Further, an appeal on decisions relating to customary land 
lay to the Supreme Court, 289  allowing an avenue back into the common law 
system. A vast number of cases were appealed, resulting in a decision by the Chief 
Justice in 2000 not to hear any more appeals.290 
 
The Island Courts still deal with minor customary disputes, but are no longer 
the main avenue for land disputes. This jurisdiction was transferred to Customary 
Land Tribunals in 2001 by the Customary Land Tribunal Act.291 This Act set up a 
complex hierarchy of tribunals within custom areas, constituted by village chiefs, 
to resolve customary land disputes.292 Whilst appeal to a common law court was 
excluded,293 this Act did not confer exclusive jurisdiction on the Tribunals. The 
common law courts retained jurisdiction to deal with disputes about leases of 
customary land and the Supreme Court had a power of review for lack of due 
process.294 In practice a large number of cases, pending before the Island or 
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Supreme Courts in 2001, continued to be heard by Island Courts, with appeals still 
being heard by the Supreme Court.295  
 
In 2013, the legal landscape was altered again by the Custom Land 
Management Act, which purports to allow customary institutions to make all 
decisions regarding customary land. This Act states in opening: 
 
The Parliament of Vanuatu has formalised the recognition of customary institutions 
termed ‘nakamals’ and ‘custom area land tribunals’ in this Act to determine the 
rules of custom which form the basis of ownership and use of land in Vanuatu. 
 
The Act provides for decisions of these bodies to become ‘recorded 
interests in land which are binding in law’. In a bold effort to exclude the common 
law courts (and to honour the specific constitutional mandate296) the Act purports 
to prevent them from reviewing decisions and from hearing appeals.297 To avoid a 
challenge for unconstitutionality based on Chapter 8, which vests administration of 
justice in the judiciary 298  and confers unlimited jurisdiction on the Supreme 
Court,299 the Constitution was itself amended.300 A new sub-article provides that 
‘[d]espite the provisions of Chapter 8 … the final substantive decisions reached by 
customary institutions or procedures in accordance with Article 74,301 after being 
recorded in writing, are binding in law and are not subject to appeal or any other 
form of review by any Court of law.’302 Interestingly, the Judicial Services and 
Courts Act, 303  which echoes Article 49 of Chapter 8 (conferring unlimited 
jurisdiction on the Supreme Court), has not been amended. This could be argued 
to provide a way around the exclusionary provisions,304 and conceivably even the 
constitutional exclusion might be circumvented, for example in the case of review 
for jurisdictional error.305  
 
Following these amendments, subject to the drafting uncertainties noted, 
only nakamals and custom area land tribunals have jurisdiction to make decisions 
about customary land, with Island Courts (land) having jurisdiction to review in 
limited circumstances, including for lack of due process or fraud.306 However, it 
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would be overstating the case to say that these reforms have returned decision 
making to traditional institutions.307 Whilst the composition and procedure of the 
tribunals have been informed by customary practices,308 they are not traditional 
but legislated bodies. Nakamals are customary institutions, but their composition 
and practices have changed over time and, according to research, they are not 
uniformly recognised as having authority to make decisions on customary land.309 
Further, the processes laid down by the Act are not customary. For example, if a 
nakamal has not determined ownership within thirty days the parties must be 
invited to submit to mediation, and if that fails they must apply to a custom area 
land tribunal to resolve the dispute.310 Further, decisions must be recorded in 
writing at a central office and this constitutes evidence of customary title. This 
poses the risk that a parallel system of registration for customary land titles may 
result in conflicting titles. Government lands and justice department officials are 
also involved, resulting in a complex arrangement that is far removed from 
customary processes.  
 
In practice, the Act has again failed to keep land cases away from the 
common law courts. This is highlighted by the recent judicial review in 
Kwirinavanua v Tetrau311 which arose from a 2013 decision of the Efate Island 
Court regarding ownership of land. The Island Court was dealing with this matter 
because it had been filed in 1996, before jurisdiction was transferred to the 
Customary Land Tribunals and subsequently to the nakamals. Under the 
Customary Land Tribunal Act and the Custom Land Management Act, cases 
pending before the Island or Supreme Courts may not be dealt with under the new 
legislation without the consent of all parties.312 The successful party in the Island 
Court, a representative of the Toumata Tetrau family (the ‘Family’), wrote to the 
Custom Land Management Office Coordinator requesting a certificate of recorded 
interest. Some time afterwards a certificate was issued and in 2016 members of 
the Family were granted a negotiators’ certificate 313  identifying the Family as 
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custom owners of the land.314 However, on 9 November 2016,315 the Coordinator 
received notification from Family Saurei that they had appealed the Island Court 
decision and in January 2017 on the basis of the unresolved appeal the 
Coordinator notified the Family that the certificate of recorded interest was 
cancelled. On judicial review the Supreme Court quashed the decision to cancel 
the certificate; directing the issue of a new one to the Family. The Coordinator 
appealed to the Court of Appeal, which held that the decision of the Island Court 
was not final as there was an appeal on foot, and upheld the Coordinator’s power 
to set aside a certificate (‘a document of limited importance in the scheme’)316 – a 
duty here where it had been wrongly issued. The Court ordered the substantive 
appeal to be continued before the Supreme Court.317 
 
The parties to various cases pending before the Island or Supreme Courts 
are unlikely to consent318 to their being dealt with under the new regime, given that 
legal representation is not allowed before a customary land tribunal319 (or by 
implication a nakamal). And until final decisions are made there can be no 
recorded interest. At some time in the future one can assume that decisions 
relating to customary land will (subject to drafting uncertainties raised earlier)320 
be dealt with outside the common law courts. Whilst the new Act is far from perfect, 
it is a step forward in the meaningful recognition of customary laws and processes 
in relation to land.   
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
As noted at the outset, there has for some years been a growing awareness of the 
inherent pluralism that underlies modern legal realities. Indigenous histories 
illustrate that customary laws have tended to be submerged, with air holes placed 
cautiously across the years for the western law’s own specific purposes.321 Yet 
understanding has deepened — understanding of the sophistication and resilience 
of Indigenous legal traditions,322 of the profound legacies of colonialism, and of 
contemporary Indigenous needs and priorities. In this new setting it becomes ever 
clearer that western legal systems in fact depend, for their relevance and 
legitimacy, upon their reflexivity in accommodating other legal norms. It has been 
noted in the Canadian context that ‘the validity of the law can no longer be 
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maintained via a single imperial voice’.323 In Vanuatu, there is added reason for 
Ni-Vanuatu to have a significant voice, given that they form the vast majority of the 
population. The intractable difficulty is that while ‘recognition’ might be readily 
pronounced, meaningful accommodation of other legal traditions and their 
attending rights is a difficult undertaking.324 For Indigenous legal traditions the 
challenge first requires a broad acknowledgment of the very different values and 
worldviews engaged,325 as has been recognised in various countries.326 
 
The Canada and Vanuatu examples, emerging from very different contexts, 
illustrate well many of the specific difficulties encountered in a pursuit of genuine 
legal pluralism. The challenges necessarily differ somewhat in each country, but 
ultimately they all reflect the struggle that ensues when one legal system re-
surfaces in the path of another. This struggle is not just one of minority peoples, 
for as noted above Vanuatu has a large Indigenous majority. It is often also, 
perhaps primarily, the struggle of local traditions in the shadow of an international 
cultural and institutional hegemony.  
 
Both Canada and Vanuatu have wrestled with the precise hierarchy of laws 
— in the context of a complex colonial history in Vanuatu327 and most recently in 
the context of a delicate federal-provincial balance in Canada — and this warrants 
further close exploration in both jurisdictions. Both countries have dealt 
incompletely with the issue of whether and when customary principles might be 
subject to sacrosanct western tenets found in bill of rights-type provisions (or more 
amorphous notions of ‘equality’ before the law). Canada, in particular, has also 
grappled with what public interests might justify an exception to the protection of 
customary rights (and with what level of consultation). Both countries have 
struggled with ‘process’: e.g., whether prescribed processes are culturally 
consistent (or unduly intrusive), or indeed whether processes might lose authority 
(and be bypassed), atrophy with infrequent use, or in various ways be subsumed 
back into mainstream litigation. There are also problems with how customary laws 
and rights are framed (most acutely in Canada). These can arise from the 
difficulties of translation, local variation, past erosion and/or changed context — or 
indeed from the subjectivity of a western system that remains suspicious of 
adaptation and self-government aspirations. Constitutional context can exacerbate 
these challenges, obscure reform purposes and hinder resolution of disputes – via 
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broad and aspirational drafting, the additional complexity of more legal ‘layers’, 
and/or greater public and political entanglement.  
 
Most clearly, the Canada and Vanuatu examples illustrate that broad 
drafting and governmental inaction lead inexorably to the courts, leaving them the 
problem of devising a jurisprudence to accommodate the complex demands of 
pluralism. The courts will necessarily be incremental and ad hoc, and may be 
somewhat distracted by reconciliations with existing common law process and 
precedent. And there will very likely be ensuing debates about the cultural 
competence of legal professionals and the judicial conflation of legal, moral and 
political questions in the pursuit of such large issues – upon which, in the 
constitutional context, the courts might often be having something of a final say.328 
 
The experiences of Canada and Vanuatu suggest that some specific 
initiatives might ease the difficulties in a confluence of legal systems. There might 
seem to be a need (for example) for greater precision in the drafting of key 
‘recognition’ provisions, a more careful and collaborative process design, or more 
investment in studies of customary principles and their context. Yet many of the 
challenges defy any easy ‘fix’. They involve deeper disjunctions in understanding 
and purpose — and questions that are not easily answered. How are customary 
‘laws’ or ‘rights’ extracted from very different, often deeply holistic worldviews and 
legitimately translated for western legal projects?329 Is the western system to be 
rewarded for its own past undermining of customary practices? Can it claim some 
priority for its own central tenets and purposes? And what is the precise purpose 
and hence strength of ‘recognition’? Is it a mere acknowledgment or a true 
accommodation? And if the latter, is it a largely historical and perhaps transitional 
exercise, a restorative or preservationist western experiment, or a genuine attempt 
to make space for dynamic emanations of contemporary self-government?330   
 
The ongoing struggles with such questions tell us that the collaboration 
essential to this undertaking must begin earlier and run deeper. Agendas need to 
be collaboratively re-opened, as even the championed concepts of ‘recognition’ 
and ‘reconciliation’ themselves proceed from western reference points (or perhaps 
harbour western defences).331 Canada has been drawn backwards to a more 
significant collaboration (with a deepening focus on consultation and self-
government) through torturous case law. Yet meaningful recognition of customary 
laws and rights can be a more deliberate course. Space can be made for co-
reflection on purpose, co-design, mutual education, and genuine partnership in 
success and failure.332 It would seem that this deeper collaboration, with real 
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space for a resurgence of the traditional perspectives that western law seeks to 
animate for its own purposes,333 is what will lead to clarity in drafting and process 
design (and wider acceptance of processes that are in place). It is this that will lead 
to informed balancing of competing interests, and ownership at higher levels of the 
challenges currently left to the courts. And ultimately it is this collaboration that can 
make the law properly responsive to the aspirations of all members of society, and 
indeed sustain the rule of law in the face of the pluralism inherent in contemporary 
legal realities. 
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